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person's problems or to support programs to benefit all Americans.

Mr. Caddy, in his libelous book, has attempted to tar such innocent men and women with the ugly brush of illegal and unethical action. He implies that the illegal contributions of corporations—contributions taken from profits and given in a hidden and clandestine way—are similar to the contributions of working people given in an open and recorded way.

Illegal contributions, from whatever source, are never to be condoned. The key to understanding the difference is that those whose money is used in an illegal contribution from corporate funds do not know their money has been given away. Those who voluntarily give their money openly to help in a political organization—whether it is through a labor union or a professional association like AMA—do know where their money is going.

Mr. Caddy's book is using the big-lie technique to attack the right of workingmen and women to participate freely and openly in the American political system. I am shocked and dismayed that this kind of book has ever been put into print.

In this year of aroused public interest in the propriety of all political funding and campaign contributions, this scurrilous book attempts to mislead readers in a manner which must bring shame even to Mr. Caddy. He is a lawyer who should know the dangers of making false accusations and should understand the divisive and ugly results of confusing legal and voluntary political gifts with illegal and involuntary political payoffs.

Any threat to truth becomes a threat to the body politic. This book is such a threat, and I do not hesitate to denounce it.

The New Mexican, published in Santa Fe, N. Mex., has recently published a response to Mr. Caddy's cruel attack, in a guest column written by Mary Sue Buchly, New Mexico State AFL-CIO COPE director.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Miss Buchly's article be published in the Record following my remarks. I strongly urge my colleagues to read this statement and to take this opportunity to be alerted to the danger of placing any credence in Mr. Caddy's effort.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Santa Fe New Mexican]

OFFICIAL OF AFL-CIO DEFENDS POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

(A response to a charge that the AFL-CIO's COPE (Committee on Political Education) flagrantly violates the law is presented in this guest column for vacationing Fred Buckles by Mary Sue Buchly, New Mexico State AFL-CIO COPE director.)

(By Mary Sue Buchly)

ALBUQUERQUE.—Political contributions and their effects have been high priority among the general public and media for two years.

A recent publication authorized by Douglas Caddy, who also doubled in brass as defense counsel for the Watergate Seven, has

made broad statements relative to political contributions by COPE.

There is basically no argument with Caddy's arithmetic; however, a serious error emerges in his book, "The Million Dollar Payoff."

Caddy erroneously states COPE "flagrantly violates the law." He says union members' dues are used to further and advance the AFL-CIO position in the political arena.

All funds used by COPE, which are used for political contributions, are voluntary and furthermore are never withheld from wages in any form.

All COPE's funds can be legally identified. COPE's source is always from fund-raising programs and voluntary contributions on a local, state and national level contributed by working people.

The reader should evaluate and make a comparison of COPE contributions versus corporate industrial contributions. It is a matter of public record that the milk industries' contributions to President Nixon caused an increase in the cost of milk and dairy products to every citizen with the only consideration being greater unfair profits for a chosen few.

The petroleum industry, whose multi-million dollar political war chest was used in behalf of President Nixon, produced a questionable gasoline shortage but unquestionable high increase in corporate profits at the expense of every car owner for the benefit of a "few corporate heads."

The American Medical Association for decades has totaled multi-million dollar political contributions to all legislation that would improve the general public's health care.

They opposed Medicare for 20 years and today are opposing a fair and equitable health plan that would benefit the entire American population to maintain high profits.

The list is long of vested interests who have used the political contribution route to create anti-public consumer legislation and to kill any legislative efforts that would protect and improve the American's lot in life.

COPE, through its voluntary contributions from 16 million American wage earners and consumers, is one of the few national organizations structured to support people-oriented laws.

COPE does not limit itself in supporting "labor laws nationally or statewide. We have an honorable record in supporting such legislation as minimum wage which is a fair day's pay for a fair day of work for all Americans.

Labor has supported job safety to protect workers so that unnecessary permanent injury would not put them on the disabled welfare rolls. A good and comprehensive health care plan that could bring decent and basic health care to the public is always adamantly supported in Congress by the AFL-CIO. This labor concern is not restrictive but general.

Labor champions workmen's compensation legislation that will assist a family wage earner when he is injured on the job which allows his family to maintain some semblance of a decent living during his recuperative period.

The political contributions by selfish, vested interests come from profits created by the public and used directly against their best interests. COPE funds are not derived from corporate profits. They are derived from the working man who cares about his fellow American.

Therefore, it can be easily identified that big business funds which are used for political contributions are surplus-profits that are paid for by the average citizen. Their

own money is used to create legislation that is negative to the public's best interest.

It is not to say that labor does not believe in profit motivation. It is not to any that labor is opposed to the free enterprise system.

But we feel it should be universally objectionable to use excess profits to the detriment of the general public in the form of public contributions that will foster price gouging and enabling legislation that will minimize public services which could be beneficial for all.

ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS FOR AID TO INDOCHINA

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, on July 24, 1974, Mr. Fred Branfman, co-director of the Indochina Resource Center, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the fiscal year 1975 administration proposals for aid to Indochina. His statement contains a wealth of penetrating insights and revealing statistical data about our continuing involvement in Indochina, including the covert ways in which our aid still serves to fuel the unended war there. Because of the relevance of this material to the Congress consideration of the administration's fiscal year 1975 request for aid to Indochina, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT OF FREDRIC R. BRANFMAN, CO-DIRECTOR, THE INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

PRESIDENTIAL COVERT WAR AND U.S. AID TO INDOCHINA, JULY 24, 1974

An update and introduction to the Indochina Resource Center/Narmic analyses of the FY 1975 administration aid proposals for Indochina.

Fredric Branfman is co-director of the Indochina Resource Center, located at 1322 18th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Its telephone number is (202) 785-3111.

The Indochina Resource Center is a church-sponsored private research group which regularly monitors dozens of official documents, newspapers and magazines, and receives personal correspondence from individuals on the scene in Indochina.

Mr. Branfman's testimony is based on this ongoing research, as well as 4½ years experience in Indochina over the past 7 years. His most recent visit was a post-ceasefire trip to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand from April through August, 1973. He also visited North Vietnam in November, 1972, and spent four years based in Laos as an educational adviser and writer from 1967-1971.

Mr. Branfman has written widely on Indochina. *Voices From the Plain of Jars*, published by Harper and Row, is a moving description of American bombing in Laos; "The Presidential War in Laos: 1964-1970", in *Laos: War and Revolution*, a Harper and Row publication, describes U.S. involvement in Laos during that period; his articles have also appeared in *Harper's*, the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Washington Monthly*, *Newsday*, the *Progressive*, *Ramparts*, and dozens of other newspapers and magazines around the country. He has also frequently given testimony to Congressional committees, including the U.S. Senate Refugee and Government Operations Subcommittees, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

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Presidential covert war and U.S. aid to Indochina
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INTRODUCTION: A SOLUTION TO OUR INDOCHINA INVOLVEMENT EXISTS

The pages which follow document our belief that present Administration policy in Indochina is leading to major new military confrontations there. We demonstrate that present U.S. policy is bringing untold misery to the people of Vietnam, unacceptable costs to the people of this country, and cannot lead to peace.

Before turning to this analysis of present policy, however, we wish to stress that there is an alternative that would be acceptable to most Americans: observation of the Paris Agreement.

It is often said that the Paris Agreement is a mere scrap of paper, since both sides are violating it.

To call it a mere scrap of paper, however, is to deny that our involvement in Indochina can ever be ended. The great importance of the Paris Agreement is that it does provide an honorable way, indeed the only way, that the war in Indochina can be ended.

For 10 long years the US fought in Vietnam with no real public hope that the war would stop. The battles went on and on, with no political solution in sight.

Now finally, after a million deaths, there is finally a political solution to a war which cannot be won on the battlefield, a formal peace agreement signed by all parties directly concerned.

This Agreement, moreover, offers a way that we can end our involvement without it being said that we reneged on our "commitments", were defeated, or "bugged out". It provides for a relatively orderly political process by which the Vietnamese people will be free to choose their own leaders, free of outside political interference. It is clear, moreover, that such a political process will see the emergence for the foreseeable future of some kind of coalition mechanism that will prevent any side from claiming absolute victory or defeat.

To downgrade the importance of the Paris Agreement, this political solution, is to say that there can be no political solution to the fighting. It is to accept the notion that the war will continue indefinitely. To minimize the Paris Agreement in any way, therefore, is in effect to encourage war.

To stress the importance of the Paris Agreement, however, is to be for peace. By insisting that both sides adhere to it, by

ensuring that our side is doing everything possible to at least test the other side's offer to negotiate, is not only desirable. It is absolutely necessary if our Indochina involvement is ever to end.

Such a policy, as we can see in Laos so far, can work. There is no reason why there cannot be a Laos-like solution to the Indochina war, if Congress ensures that our aid is not being used in a way that blocks implementation of the Paris Agreement.

The Paris Agreement is, quite simply, a realistic hope for peace in Vietnam—the only one that now exists. And it is a hope for peace which can be realized, if we want it to.

I. COVERT WAR: A CHALLENGE TO CONGRESS FOR THE 1970'S

One of the dominant, if least understood facts of this latter half of the 20th century is that we have entered an era characterized by a new form of war-making, a phenomenon we shall call *Presidential covert war*.

By this we mean that the Executive officials of today's superpowers have opted away from conventional or nuclear war and for war by proxy—"low-profile" war in which they rely on intensive use of technology and relatively few American personnel to wage clandestine war abroad.

One of the basic facts of our lives as Americans is that our Executive branch today can and does wage war abroad without the knowledge or consent of the American people.

There are many examples of such Presidential covert war in recent times, from U.S. Executive intervention in Ethiopia to the Congo to the Philippines to Iran. The most dramatic example of such covert war-making today, however, is Indochina.

During the 1960's, Indochina became the symbol of *direct* U.S. Military involvement in the Third World. Responding to a clear mandate from the American people, Congress has moved to end our *direct* combat involvement in Indochina. By doing so, it has clearly signaled the end of an era, bringing hope to most Americans that Congress will never allow massive U.S. combat involvement in another Third World country.

Today, in the mid-1970's, however, Indochina has now become the symbol of *indirect* covert U.S. involvement in the Third World. Such covert war, we believe, is objectionable both for moral and practical reasons, and leads to increasing pressures for *direct* U.S. intervention.

The time when this country could afford the luxury of supporting "low-profile" wars abroad has clearly passed. Such factors as the coming crunch on energy and other key resources, the exponential increase in the costs of both modern weaponry and a volunteer army, rampant inflation and rising labor costs, have reduced American options.

Last year, for example, we could not both wage covert war in Indochina and feed the most needy in other parts of the world. The Administration wound up sending increased "Food For Peace" shipments to fund war in Indochina, up from \$208.8 to \$502.6 million; but only \$77 million was made available to the Sahel, where tens of thousands of human beings literally starved to death.

We would suggest, therefore, that Congress terminating the Executive's unilateral ability to wage covert war is as urgent a task for the 70's, as was Congress finally coming to grips with U.S. direct combat abroad during the 60's.

Congressional suspension or reduction of proposed Administration expenditures in Indochina, then, will do far more than simply signal an end to our otherwise unending involvement there. It will also mean that the people of the United States will finally be freed of the burden of supporting worldwide covert war, the people of the Third World finally free to pursue their own destinies.

II. CONGRESS IS BEING ASKED TO FUND WAR IN INDOCHINA

Indochina remains the largest war in the world today.

The latest reports, for example, indicate that 350,000 soldiers on both sides in Vietnam have been killed or wounded since the ceasefire. (UPI dispatch, June 11, 1974). This is more than ten times the official casualties reported during and after the October Mid-East War. In addition there were 85,000 *Civilians* killed and wounded, and 818,000 new refugees in the first post-ceasefire year, according to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees; and hundreds of thousands more have been killed, wounded or made homeless in Cambodia since the ceasefire.

In all, Indochina may well have had more war victims created in the last 18 months than the rest of the world combined.

Given this raging war, Administration aid requests for Indochina are clearly intended to fund war, not produce peace. This fact is made clear by the tremendous priority the Administration puts on Indochina compared to other countries, as well as a close analysis of its actual requested expenditures.

The Indochina Resource Center and NAR IIC, a project of the American Friends Service Committee, have recently submitted Administration requests to the first such close analysis in the history of the war. Two studies we have produced, which we would like to submit for the record, emphasize the following points:

(1) The Administration is proposing to spend \$3.7 billion for Indochina, more than for the rest of the world combined (see Table 1). This will provide Thieu and Lon Nol governments with 90% of their total resources, including all of their war material.

(2) Food For Peace to Indochina in FY 74 totalled 49% of worldwide shipments, meaning that 0.8% of the world's population received nearly half the world's U.S. supplied food (see Table 2). Although some 100,000 persons are estimated to have starved to death in Sahel, for example, Sahel received only 15% or 1/4 of what Indochina received—because Food For Peace was indirectly used to finance war last year.

(3) U.S. aid in Indochina is not leading to stability, but only demands for more money. In FY 74, for example, the Administration began with a request for \$827.8 million to South Vietnam and Cambodia in economic aid (IPE plus Food For Peace). By the end of FY 74 it had allocated \$1.52 billion, an increase of 27%. This year it is demanding \$1.81 billion, an increase of 40% over last year's request (see Tables 3 & 4).

(4) An admitted 88% of this year's aid proposal is non-humanitarian, non-developmental in nature; i.e., 88% is for war. In reality, moreover, only 2% is truly humanitarian. Requested *military* aid to the three Administration-supported governments is also up this year, moreover. In Fiscal Year 1974, \$1.468 billion was allocated; the Administration is now requesting \$2.05 billion, an increase of 40%. Most significantly, the Administration is requesting \$852 million for "procurement" for South Vietnam, a sum more than double the \$359 million programmed for Fiscal Year 1974. This makes it clear that the Administration is vastly increasing Thieu's material, in violation of the "one for one" clause of the Paris Agreement and a congressional mandate to reduce our military spending in Indochina. (See Tables 4 & 5).

(5) The Administration has blatantly violated a congressional mandate to reduce aid to Indochina in Fiscal Year 1975. Any Congressional attempts to cut aid in FY 75, therefore, must be massive. Last year, "Indochina Postwar Reconstruction" aid was cut

¹ IIR—"Indochina Postwar Reconstruction", formerly known as "economic aid".

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from a requested \$632 million to an allocation of \$450 million. By unilaterally increasing Food For Peace shipments from a requested \$208 million to an estimated allocation of \$502.6 million, however, the Administration has not only restored cuts in economic aid, it has exceeded its original FY 74 request in a blatant violation of congressional will. (See Table 3).

Indeed, Food For Peace to Indochina last year (\$502.6 million) turned out to be more than normal economic aid (IPR funds totaling \$450 million). In addition, the Executive possesses a wide variety of other loopholes—including the Food and Forage Act, huge amounts of War Reserve material built up especially for Indochina and over which Congress has little control, ceilingless "excess defense article" and "purchase of local currency" categories and an uncontrolled CIA budget.²

(6) The Administration's proposed aid to Indochina can only lead to an escalated war, while preventing a political settlement.

By channeling lavish military aid to the GVN and Lon Nol, the Administration is not leaving the other side any political incentives to negotiate. The U.S. supported GVN has outlawed the PRG for example, thus leaving it no choice but surrender or pushing back militarily in order to force the GVN to seek a political settlement. If Administration FY 75 aid requests are passed, the only result will be an escalating war which is directly leading to major new military confrontations in Indochina. Such confrontations, moreover, could see the Administration attempt to renew American bombing and/or send in U.S. ground troops.

Only Congress can bring about a very real potential solution: be reducing or suspending aid to Thieu and Lon Nol, Congress could make it in the Administration's interest to bring about a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam and Cambodia, as it has done in Laos.

III. COVERT WAR: THE ADMINISTRATION METHODOLOGY

The fact that the Administration is requesting such massive funding for war in Indochina is not the essence of its covert warring in Indochina, however. On the contrary, it is the Administration's direct involvement in the internal affairs of Indochina—through control of billions in aid and thousands of U.S. personnel—that characterizes Presidential war.

This direct U.S. involvement is of necessity disguised or "covert". Congress and the American people have made it clear they no longer wish the U.S. to be involved; such direct American involvement is precluded by the Paris Agreement; and world opinion has turned against further American intervention.

As a result, the Administration goes out of its way to hide its involvement. All documents indicating Presidential branch involvement are classified. American military personnel are disguised as civilians, and are instructed to avoid non-U.S. mission contact as much as possible. Administration spokesmen are instructed to emphatically deny all reports of U.S. involvement. Leaks are greatly reduced due to the few reporters and smaller numbers of American personnel involved in such a covert war.

Deliberate attempts are made to deceive Congress.

At its simplest level, this attempt involves an Orwellian change in nomenclature. A war

² There are also signs that the Administration may try backdoor funding of Thieu through the World Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) guarantees of private American investment in South Vietnam.

budget is presented as "Indochina Postwar Reconstruction"; this year's fiscal year 1975 budget now calls the former "Commodity Import Program," widely known as a short-term, war-related, budgetary device to keep the GVN alive, "Food and Nutrition" and "Industrial Production"; food commodities designed to free funds for local war budgets are called "Food For Peace"; money designed to resettle refugees in unfarmable land to expand territorial control of the GVN is called "humanitarian" aid.

Numerous direct attempts are made, moreover, deliberately to deprive Congress of requested information. On April 2, 1974, for example, Senator Kennedy revealed that the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon, Mr. Graham Martin, had interfered with attempts by the Congressional investigatory service, the General Accounting Office. Kennedy reported that: "The Senate should also be aware of Ambassador Martin's unwarranted interference in field investigation of U.S. foreign aid expenditures by investigators of the GAO. Not only has the Ambassador intervened at the highest levels of the GAO to curb their inquiries, but he has repeatedly made every effort to restrict the investigators' access and use of information in the Embassy files. And he has even attempted to censor the transfer of GAO information from Saigon to Washington."

On the same day, of course, Kennedy also revealed the well-known cable of Ambassador Martin counselling that "it would be the height of folly to permit Kennedy . . . an honest and detailed answer" to questions presented to the State Department.

A GAO request to investigate U.S. funding of political prisoners in South Vietnam met with similar treatment by the State Department. "The State Department has told the General Accounting Office that it will not be possible for the GAO to make a proposed investigation of political prisoners in South Vietnam and other nations . . ." the Washington Star-News reported on February 9, 1974. Major attempts are also made to hide Executive involvement from the American press.

American installations are declared off-limits to American reporters. American personnel are instructed to either avoid or lie to American journalists about their real functions. American reporters are not given transportation to "sensitive" areas where American military or paramilitary advisers are operating.

In South Vietnam, for example, Ambassador Graham Martin has restricted press access to American officials. On January 30, 1974, for example, The Christian Science Monitor reported that:

"By itself, the official U.S. mission in South Vietnam . . . is still the largest American mission in the world. No major reductions are expected in the foreseeable future . . . (Ambassador Martin) is trying to discourage any publicity concerning the American presence here . . . Major General John E. Murray, the chief of the Defense Attaché Office . . . was recently told to stop giving interviews. . . ."

Such reports have been echoed by the Chicago Tribune, which referred on June 9, 1974, to Martin's "continuing effort to restrict the flow of information from official American sources to the press." On February 25, 1974, moreover, The New York Times reported that "the Embassy told at least two private companies—Lear-Siegler which employs a large force of aircraft mechanics here and Computer Science Corporation, which works on military and police computer systems—to say nothing publicly about their work, according to company executives."

Attempts to keep journalists away from Indochina news extends to places like Thai-

land, moreover. On January 11, 1974, the Los Angeles Times reported on an infrequent trip to Udorn Airforce Base in Thailand that:

"When American reporters asked to talk with members of this American unit (working with Lao and Cambodian pilots) they were told this could not be done without the consent of the Thai government."

Given such restrictions on the press, it is remarkable how many reports have leaked out in the past year and a half indicating a pattern of covert American involvement in Indochina reminiscent of, but far greater than, the kind of disguised Presidential intervention in Indochina between 1954 and 1962 which led to direct involvement later.

The pages which follow present many of these newspaper reports indicating the well-known pattern of Presidential covert involvement in Indochina, as well as other reports from direct participants in Indochina after the ceasefire.

No one of these reports in and of itself is proof positive of continuing U.S. covert war.

When considered as a whole, however, these reports are clearly a major cause for alarm.

The publication of these newspaper reports about U.S. involvement in Indochina between 1954 and 1962 were surprisingly accurate, despite the fact that they were hotly denied by Executive branch officials at the time.

Given this history, it would be the height of folly for Congress to ignore the numerous press and first-person reports which have come out of Indochina since the ceasefire. We had to wait nearly 20 years for the Pentagon Papers, during which time a small covert war grew into a massive overt one.

It has become more than clear that unless Congress acts to reduce our funding of Presidential covert war in Indochina this year, history may well repeat itself.

IV. COVERT WAR: BACKGROUND

Historically, the American people and Congress have taken the Executive's word on matters of public policy. The burden of proof has laid upon critics to disprove Administration claims, rather than on the Administration to provide evidence that it is living up to its word.

In the case of Presidential war-making abroad, however, the U.S. Executive branch has clearly forfeited public or congressional trust. For since World War II, it has been revealed countless times that the Executive has been intervening abroad while covering it up at home.

In Indochina alone, for example, Executive activities that have now been revealed after being hidden from the American people and Congress for years include:

Installing Ngo Dinh Diem in power in 1954, acknowledged within the American Mission as an unpopular dictator who unilaterally cancelled elections in 1956 in violation of the Geneva Accords, while publicly praised as a popular, democratic, sovereign leader (Pentagon Papers); withholding information from Congress and the American people about U.S.-directed commando raids against North Vietnam, thus making the Gulf of Tonkin incident appear unprovoked (Pentagon Papers); funding and directing Thai and other foreign troops in Laos, in direct violation of Congressional law; secretly bombing Cambodia for 14 months, and falsifying records so that the U.S. Congress and people would not know; publicly denying the bombing of northern Laos from May 1964 until September 1969 when Congress was first told, and March 1970, when the American people first heard; U.S. cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia in 1971 and 1972, thus expressly violating Congressional law against sending U.S. ground forces into these countries; carrying out rain-making missions over Indochina while publicly denying that they were being carried out; attempting to cause

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fire storms, also not acknowledged until years later.³

And, in addition to these now officially-confirmed covert activities, there are a wide variety of other clandestine activities which have been revealed by numerous persons with first-person experience, but are still officially denied by the Executive branch. These include the sending of military personnel into Laos and instructing them to wear civilian clothes and carry cards identifying them as working for the Agency for International Development; the dispatch of U.S.-directed intelligence-gathering teams into China and North Vietnam from northern Laos, thus jeopardizing the shaky neutrality of Laos; the use of CIA-trained Vietnamese to dress like the NLF and carry out atrocities, in the hope of having these blamed on the NLF; the falsification of documents given to the American and Vietnamese press; U.S. established quotas which led to the deliberate assassinations of tens of thousands of Vietnamese under the U.S.-sponsored Phoenix program.

This record of Executive deceit alone suggests that the U.S. Presidential branch may be reasonably required to advance evidence that it is not engaged in similar activities today, rather than requiring critics to advance documentary proof.

The case for requiring the Executive to prove its non-involvement, however, is immeasurably strengthened by a little-noticed but tremendously important story, reported in the Los Angeles Times on May 16, 1974. This report states that:

"The Air Force law office says it is legal, for military or foreign policy reasons, to disguise military operations through inaccurate or untrue official reports. The conclusion was stated in a memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee in connection with the Committee's investigation last year of the secret bombing of Cambodia for 14 months before May, 1970."

This shocking contention makes it clear that neither the Congress nor the American people can any longer be content with mere denials of Executive covert war in Indochina.

Indeed, logic would demand that the dozens of newspaper and first-person reports which follow, indicating Presidential covert war in Indochina, should be taken as true—with the burden for disproving them lying upon the Presidential branch.

This point, moreover, is strengthened by a consideration of four major strategic goals of Presidential covert war.

V. COVERT WAR: BASIC STRATEGIC GOALS

The purpose of continued U.S. Executive intervention in Indochina is to keep the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), Khamer Rouge, and Pathet Lao from power in Indochina.

Obtaining funding to pay the salaries of local military forces, their arms, and providing support for the general economy, is key of course. But U.S. personnel—advising the military forces and police, holding the economy together, repairing the aircraft—are no less important. For there would be no need for American intervention in the first place if a GVN or Lon Nol government was able to stand on its own.

³ Secret bombing of Cambodia and cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia are described in "The White Paper on Secret Operations in Laos and Cambodia", Senator Hughes, *Cong. Record*, September 10, 1973, S16198. Rain-making missions were recently revealed, see *Washington Post*, May 19, 1974. The bombing of Northern Laos is described in testimony before the Senate Refugee Subcommittee.

Funding of Thai mercenaries in Laos was first revealed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Firestorm attempts in Science.

It is no coincidence, for example, that as the Khmer Rouge have continued to gain territory and support in Cambodia, the *Washington Post* reported on June 8, 1974, that:

"The new U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh, John Gunther Dean, has in two months made it absolutely clear to Cambodians and foreigners alike in Phnom Penh that he is, in effect, running the country."

Nor is it surprising that after the Administration had for years attempted to avoid an open American build-up in Cambodia, the *Washington Post* reported on June 8, 1974, that:

"The Cambodian government and the U.S. Embassy are engaged in a costly program of aid to win the support of civilian populations in insurgent areas. . . . The mission now is the second largest AID unit in the world."

For the fact is that Presidential covert war is characterized by the disguised attempt to use American technology and personnel to compensate for the political deficiencies of local regimes in Indochina. Its main strategic goals—and failings—can be described thusly:

(1) Obtaining funding through manipulation of domestic public opinion—The principal requirement of Presidential covert war is funding. Neither Congress nor the American people would approve funding of Executive war-making in Indochina in violation of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, which reads "The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam." As a result, the Administration has consistently tried to deceive public opinion about its real involvement in Indochina. Such manipulation of public opinion may enjoy some short-term successes, as when the Administration managed to spend more than \$3 billion on war in Indochina in Fiscal Year 1974. Long-term results, however, are counter-productive. It leads to the wasting of billions of dollars our economy can no longer afford; it poisons the political atmosphere, as the American people gradually learn they've been deceived. Most importantly, it continues the excessive concentration of power in the Executive which has already proved so disastrous to this country. An informed public and Congress would have kept us out of Indochina in the first place, and would today see us using our resources for healing at home and abroad.

(2) Maintaining narrow-based, military-oriented local administrations in power—The Administration has chosen to continue trying to keep in power those who represent a tiny minority of the people: the civilian rich, the top-ranking military officers and, to some extent, the western-educated. The result is either that the Administration fears political competition and opts instead for war, as in South Vietnam; the U.S.-supported side becomes so weak that the other side refuses to negotiate with it, as in Cambodia; or the U.S. is forced to accept political compromise, see the other side gain in power, and pressures grow for re-intervention, as in Laos. And the result is also increased corruption and war, leading to declining local economies and armed forces, leading to increased demands for aid from the U.S. Presidential branch.

(3) Using U.S. technology and advisers to control local military operations—Given the Administration's narrow political base in Indochina, it is forced to try and compensate by extremely heavy inputs of U.S. military advisers, war material and funding to develop and field local military forces. This makes such local forces entirely dependent on American logistics and personnel, and invariably inferior to their guerrilla adversaries. This leads to growing pressures for direct American intervention—e.g., through covert

or overt bombing by American pilots or U.S. Marine landings—ever-increasing costs, and increased deception at home.

(4) Practicing population control through police and refugee programs—Since U.S. Executive-backed local administrations cannot win popular support, the emphasis instead has been on physical control of the population. Executive policy has since the 1960s resettled nearly 14 million refugees in areas closer to U.S. Executive control in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Under the Nixon Doctrine, however, there has been a noticeably increased emphasis on police operations, ranging from greatly increased surveillance and national I.D. card programs, to constant arrests, to the physical liquidation of opponents. This practice, however, has also proved counter-productive since it violates the most basic tenets of humanity, leading to world-wide protest, increased lying by American leaders, and the further alienation of a local population constantly subject to mass surveillance, round-ups, summary sentencing, and inhuman torture and prison mistreatment.

VI. COVERT WAR: MANIPULATING DOMESTIC OPINION TO OBTAIN FUNDING

The key to the Presidential branch's ability to wage covert war is its ability to obtain funding from the Congress and American people. Such funding in turn, derives from the Executive's control over information about its activities.

We have already described (see Section III above) the methods used by the Presidential branch to keep information about its activities from Congress and the American people. This attempt, however, is only partially successful, and information frequently leaks out contradicting the Administration's public position.

A few examples of how the Administration has tried to deceive Congress and the American people about the military and political situation in Indochina in order to obtain funding follow:

(i) Executive deception on military matters

1. Ceasefire Violations—American officials constantly claim that the communists have taken the initiative in violating the ceasefire militarily. Yet Representative Peter Frelinghuysen, a major spokesman favoring continued aid to the Thieu government, recently stated on p. 4 of his May 1974 report, "Vietnam—A Changing Crucible" that:

"The GVN has fared well during post-cease-fire maneuvering: Since January 1973 it has added 770 hamlets to the list of those over which it has dominant control, and it has reportedly reduced the number of disrupted hamlets by well over a third. The Communists meanwhile have lost over 90 hamlets that were under their firm control at the time of the ceasefire . . ."

2. Violation of U.S. Pledge to Withdraw Advisers—The Administration has never revealed its secret "assurance" when signing the Paris Agreement that it would withdraw all military or civilian advisers to the Vietnamese armed forces within 12 months. This pledge, revealed in a secret memo prepared by George Aldrich, State Department deputy legal adviser, states in part that:

"Secret—The United States has assured the DRV that we shall withdraw from South Vietnam within 12 months from the signature of the agreement all our civilian personnel working in the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam." (*Wash. Post*, June 4, 1974)

When this pledge was revealed by author Tad Szulc, the State Department denied that this "assurance" constituted a firm promise to do so. Today, over 17 months after the signing of that Agreement, some 3,800 American civilians continue to work with the South Vietnamese Armed Services.

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On June 3, 1974, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported that at the end of March 1974, 2,643 U.S. employees contracted to the Pentagon were working with the South Vietnamese military, 936 were employed directly by the Defense Attache Office in Saigon, and 225 made up the official DAO military contingent.

3. Exaggerating PRG Military Pressure—U.S. and GVN officials have blatantly attempted to deceive the American people and Congress about the Thieu government's need for economic and military aid. During March and October, 1973, for example, Administration spokesmen trumpeted the idea that a "North Vietnamese offensive" was imminent. To this day, of course, none has materialized.

Even more serious was the transparently false attempt to wangle an extra \$474 million supplemental military appropriation for the GVN during the spring of 1974. The U.S. Congress was flatly told that if Thieu did not have this money, his army might collapse. On March 12, 1974, for example, Assistant Secretary of Defense William Clements testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

"Without additional funds the South Vietnamese forces are going to be in extremely dire straits here in April, May and June. There is just no doubt about it. . . . We are going to run out of funds here in the latter part of this fiscal year unless we are given additional funds."

In the event, of course, the funding request was denied. Theoretically, the ARVN should thus have been near collapse. In fact, however, the Washington Post reported on May 9, 1974, after the request had been denied, that:

"(Pentagon spokesman) Friedheim also appeared to take a less dire view . . . than have some other White House and Defense officials. Friedheim noted that . . . only two months remain in the current fiscal year."

4. Exaggerating Nature of Soviet and Chinese Aid—Ambassador Graham Martin has stated that "our intention all along was to balance the aid given by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to North Vietnam."

According to the estimates of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency itself, however, Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam in 1973 was only \$290 million. U.S. military aid to the GVN alone in calendar year 1973, however, was \$2.271 billion, or eight times as much. When one remembers that the United States alone spent hundreds of millions in direct expenditures for U.S. military forces, as well as hundreds of millions of dollars more in Cambodia and Laos, the United States actually wound up outspending the Soviet Union and China by far more in the first year since the ceasefire.

Even more importantly, Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam decreased by 47% from 1972 to 1973, from \$605 million down to \$290 million. U.S. aid to Thieu decreased by only 5% from 1972 to 1973, however, from \$2.383 billion to \$2.271 billion. (See Tables 6 and 7.)

(B) EXECUTIVE DECEPTION ON POLITICAL MATTER.

1. Administration Humanitarian Concern—The Administration continues to stress its humanitarian concern for affairs in South Vietnam, while castigating the other side for its lack of humanitarian concern. On June 26, 1974, however, Senator Kennedy revealed confidential cables from U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin in Saigon advocating that the U.S. hold up its contribution to the International Red Cross in an attempt to pressure them not to invite the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) to an international conference to be held in Geneva in September to discuss limiting weapons which are either indiscriminate or cause unnecessary suffering; on June 23,

1974, the N.Y. Times reported that the U.S. was opposing UNICEF aid to children in North Vietnam and PRG zones.

And, most seriously, the Administration has still not even begun to remove the many mines still maiming and killing numerous Vietnamese peasants in Saigon zones.

2. Political Prisoners in South Vietnam—On May 28, Secretary Kissinger supported Graham Martin's charge that there is no evidence that Saigon is holding large numbers of political prisoners, and added that "the extensive evidence available to us simply does not sustain the highly publicized charges that civilian prisoners are subjected to widespread, systematic mistreatment. . ." (Senator Kennedy insert, C.R., May 28, 1974)

On June 7, 1974, however, Representative Abzug inserted into the Congressional Record (p. E3657) a listing of over 100 articles which emanated from Saigon, from western journalists or residents, indicating widespread mistreatment of large numbers of political prisoners; since the Saigon government has not allowed even the International Red Cross to talk freely with civilian detainees, and since it has also turned down requests for visits by Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit and other groups and individuals, the closing off of the prisons to the outside world (with the exception of a few guided tours) is cause for alarm, in and of itself. The assertion that the U.S. Embassy has "extensive evidence" on the treatment of prisoners is curious, since an earlier U.S. Embassy study stated that U.S. advisers had been withdrawn from the prisons since the ceasefire, and that Embassy information was based on "internal" GVN records.

3. Administration Policy in Laos—U.S. officials constantly maintain that they support the coalition government in Laos. Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 13, 1974, for example, Mr. Robert Nooter stated that "the formation of a Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU) this past April represents a bona fide political resolution of Laos' internal differences. The U.S. supports this effort. . ."

On June 23, 1974, however, Senator Edward Kennedy issued a press release, based on a still secret General Accounting Office report, which revealed in fact the Administration has not been supporting the PGNU at all. On the contrary. To date, all funds had been going to the right wing Royal Lao faction directly, an ominous throw-back recalling the pattern of past coup-making which has upset political settlements before in Laos.

Kennedy's charges appeared to gain some substance, moreover, by a N.Y. Times report the next day which indicated that a Vice-Admiral Ray Feet had told a House committee that U.S. objectives in Laos were "to maintain the survival of the politically neutral Royal Laotian Government . . . and to encourage pursuit by Laos of objectives compatible with the United States."

4. Administration "Food For Peace" Politics—And there is fresh indication that while pretending to obey a new Congressional prohibition against using Food For Peace monies for war, the Administration is continuing to use local currencies generated by the sale of Food For Peace commodities for military purposes in South Vietnam and Cambodia, as it has in the past.

On June 30, 1974, for example, The Washington Post reported from Phnom Penh that:

"Congressional efforts to prevent military use of funds generated by the Food For Peace program apparently are being frustrated by some ingenious bookkeeping to circumvent the intent of Congress by simply allowing the funds to pile up unused in a bank account and then printing an equal amount of new money to pay soldiers. In Saigon, it also appears possible that funds generated by the program could be channeled into other non-military areas of the

economy, freeing up equal amounts of money for military use and thus again frustrating Congress' efforts at control".

This tiny sample of Administration untruths make it clear that manipulation of domestic public opinion lies at the heart of Presidential covert war.

For the American people and Congress would clearly not support any further expenditures in Indochina were the Administration to admit the truth of the examples above, i.e., that the Administration was violating the Agreement by not withdrawing its advisers and supporting Thieu's violations of the Agreement, which were not, in turn, occasioned by either communist pressure or Soviet or Chinese aid; and that Administration policy was non-humanitarian, covering up for Thieu's political prisoners, threatening the Laotian peace agreement, and violating a congressional ban on using Food For Peace for military purposes.

VII: COVERT WAR; A COMMITMENT TO NARROW-BASED LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS

The Administration's decision to attempt to keep administrations like those of Thieu and Lon Nol in power inevitably lead it to practice covert war.

For the basic fact is that the narrow-based GVN and Lon Nol administrations cannot reach political accommodations with their adversaries. As a result, continued aid to such administrations simply encourages the perpetuation of war, leading to increased political and economic deterioration, leading to pressures for increased American involvement.

In fact, it is only when American aid is conditional upon U.S.-backed local administrations reaching a political compromise—even to their relative disadvantage—that the chances for American disengagement increase. The most dramatic example of this is Laos.

(a) Saigon zones.

The major problem facing the GVN today is political and moral in nature, not economic. AID officials try to explain the very serious problems in GVN zones as due to rising world commodity prices, the withdrawal of the American presence, and other factors out of anyone's control. In fact, as a comparison with the frugal, well-balanced economy in PRG zones reveals, the heart of the GVN's economic problem is not financial, and these problems cannot be solved by American aid. In a word, there is enough to go around in GVN zones. The problem is that the rich and the military elite are taking far more than their proper share, leaving the majority—the poor—to go hungry.

The root cause of GVN problems is the Administration's refusal to chance political competition with the PRG.

The primary responsibility for this, of course, lies with the U.S. Executive branch. The U.S., after all, supplies 86.3% of the GVN's income, including all of its ammo, guns and tanks and planes and bombs. (See insert by Senator McGovern, C.R., May 6, 1974). It is fundamentally inane to suggest that despite this preponderant role played by the U.S., it does not have the leverage to ensure that the GVN at least test the PRG's offer to compete politically.

Such political competition would appear to be in the PRG's interests. The first step toward forming the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, for example, would logically be enforcing Article 11 which gives basic democratic freedoms to all Vietnamese. Under Article 11 all Vietnamese would be given freedom of political activity (presumably freeing many political prisoners from GVN's prisons), freedom of residence (which would allow the refugees to return home), and freedom to organize (which would allow the Third Force and PRG to organize in the cities.) At the same time, the

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PRG would be expected to allow the GVN similarly to organize in PRG zones.

Perhaps because it fears that the GVN could not stand up to political competition with the PRG, the U.S. Executive has taken no known steps to push for such a political compromise. Instead, it has given uncompromising support to Thieu, whose position includes the following points:

The PRG must set a date for elections before the people can have their democratic rights as outlined in Article 11. (This position violates the Paris Agreement, which sets no conditions on the enforcement of Article 11. It could also only be viewed as an attempt to obstruct any kind of settlement by the PRG, which could hardly be expected to surface its cadre and start campaigning solely on the promise that Thieu will allow Article 11 to be enforced.)

There is no "Third Force," one of "three equal segments" recognized in article 12. (On March 25, for example, GVN spokesman Bui Bao Truc declared that "the third force is merely an imaginary segment,"—which means among other things that the National Council of Reconciliation could not come into being, since it is to be composed of the three parts.)

The North Vietnamese must withdraw from South Vietnam before the GVN will agree to elections. (Again, this position is a major violation of the Paris Agreement. The withdrawal of such a condition by the United States was clearly one of the major factors which led to the signing of the Agreement, which nowhere mentions the presence of the North Vietnamese. In Article 1 of the Agreement explicitly states that Vietnam is one country.)

The Administration, by requesting aid to the GVN despite its stated attitude toward the Paris Agreement—an attitude of setting impossible conditions which it knows in advance the other side will not meet—gives the impression that it is not seriously interested in promoting a political settlement in South Vietnam. Instead, it has clearly opted for covert war to keep the PRG from power.

This war, in turn, is the basic reason for South Vietnam's economic problems—which are enormous. As a result of the war, the U.S. supports a GVN which refuses to allow refugees to return to their native homes in or near PRG areas. This creates a great unproductive mass of millions of people either clustered near cities or resettled in arid, landless sites, millions of people who must be fed from the outside.

As a result of the war, the U.S. supports a GVN which refuses to demobilize significant portions of its 1.1 million man army, 350,000 civil servants, or 120,000 police. All 1.57 million of them do not produce and must also be paid, as well as fed.

As a result of the war, South Vietnam has seen a 75% increase in prices last year, a 35% rise this year (Baltimore Sun, May 8, 1974); cash reserves have fallen dangerously low, under \$100 million (L. A. Times, May 16); South Vietnam had to bring in imports totaling \$795 million in 1973, while exporting only \$56 million—producing a trade deficit of \$789 million.

And such economic problems, in turn, have helped increase South Vietnam's corruption problems to epidemic proportions.

In recent months, Saigon newspapers have reported a major rice smuggling operation out of Vietnam to other Asian countries where prices are higher (Dai Dan Toc, 5/11, 5/13 Dien Tin, 5/12); a timber smuggling scandal, which has seen high government officials seize 450,000 acres in the last six months, depriving the government of \$150-190 million in revenues (Dai Dan Toc, 3/15, 5/18); a scrap metal scandal, which the State Department says involves \$20-\$40 million, Saigon newspapers say is more like \$1-2 billion (Ta Sang, 4/10; Dai Dan Toc, 4/15; Chicago Tribune, 6/5); a fertilizer scandal,

by which 100-150 high-ranking officials have gotten rich through speculation, hoarding, and price manipulation (NY Post, 5/20; Song Than, 5/30; Hoa Dinh, 5/13); 50-150,000 non-existent soldiers drawing salaries (Chicago Daily News, 6/4); grass-roots corruption going to the very lowest of officials, for example a refugee official who stole money that was supposed to go to refugees to build new homes (UPI, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 12, 1974); Six ARVN Generals named as war-profiteers, by a Vietnamese Senator enjoying immunity from arrest (L.A. Times, 6/17).

The combination of this war economy coupled with thoroughgoing official corruption has produced increasing economic hardship for South Vietnam's people. The Baltimore Sun reported on May 8, for example, that:

"In the northern part of South Vietnam, people are dying of starvation because speculative rice handling has made this basic food too expensive to buy."

Reports of suicides due to economic pressures are becoming increasingly frequent (e.g., NY Times, 5/1; Dien Tin, 5/23). There are increasing reports of crumbling morale, shortages of basic commodities, massive unemployment.

The situation has become so serious, indeed, that it is unlikely that even if the Administration's full request was passed this year that it would serve as more than a mere stop-gap measure. No evidence whatsoever has been introduced to support the claim that granting \$750 million in Indochina Postwar Reconstruction aid would start South Vietnam on the road to self-sufficiency; there is a general consensus, however, that such a sum would be a mere temporary measure designed to allow the GVN to hold its own for another year—unless it is willing to work towards a political compromise.

The solution to South Vietnam's quite serious economic problems, therefore, is not simply to give a substantial amount of Food For Peace and/or Indochina Postwar Reconstruction aid. For people are not hungry for lack of food. In FY 74 for example, the GVN received more Food For Peace (\$304.8 million) than all of Africa (\$122 million), Latin America (\$67.6 million), Bangladesh (\$41.4 million) and Pakistan (\$38.1 million) combined.

The problem is that the Food For Peace South Vietnam received costs too much—due to war and corruption—for those who need it most to purchase it. Lavish American aid can only encourage war and corruption, and therefore hunger. A massive reduction in American aid will force the GVN to think about finding a political solution, thereby structurally increasing the chances that South Vietnam can become self-sufficient.

As we look towards the political arena, however, we find that once again U.S. aid is not "stabilizing" the situation, but rather leading to a deterioration in the political climate in GVN zones.

The U.S. permitting Thieu to push through an amendment for him to run for a third term as President caused Senator Nguyen Van Huyen, a leading anti-communist Catholic, to resign as head of the Senate on January 19; Senator Vu Van Mau, head of the Buddhist Lotus group, shaved his head in protest, calling Thieu a "dictator" and "incompetent"; on January 10, the NY Times reported that politics in GVN zones had been reduced to competition between two palace cliques, one headed by Thieu's cousin, Hoang Duc Nha—the other by a man named Nguyen Van Ngan; Nguyen Van Ngan was then reported arrested five months later because, at least according to one commentator, Thieu feared Ngan's rising power (LA Times, 5/31).

Meanwhile, protests—small, but visible, by the few who dare speak publicly—have continued: a hunger strike by hundreds of

Buddhist monks, Cao Dalists, and other third force political prisoners was reported in Chi Hoa prison in March (NY Times, 3/7, 3/13); 20 Fon Hao Buddhists cut off the little fingers of their left hands in protest against restrictions on them (UPI, 6/7); 300 monks were reported demonstrating in the Delta to protest arrest of six monks (Philadelphia Inquirer, 6/13); 19 Buddhists and Madame Ngo Ba Thanh led a march through Saigon calling for the release of Thieu's political prisoners (Christian Science Monitor, 5/7); a Buddhist reception for the families of political prisoners was held, though surrounded by police (Agence France Presse, 5/1).

(b) Lon Nol zones—

As bad as the political and economic situation in GVN zones is, however, the situation in Cambodia for the Lon Nol government is even more hopeless.

Once again, the responsibility for the rapidly deteriorating situation lies with a U.S. Executive branch which has preferred to wage covert war in Cambodia rather than attempt to reach a political solution, no matter how distasteful it might find such a political compromise.

As the Washington Post reported on June 30, the Lon Nol government is entirely dependent on U.S. funds to continue its day-to-day functioning: "Cambodia's domestically generated government revenues from taxes in fiscal year 1974 amounted to \$54 million—not nearly enough to cover its \$109 million military and \$60 million civilian budgets." And, of course, the U.S. is supplying all transport, arms, ammunition, and other basic commodities.

The basic fact is that Lon Nol controls little more than a few major towns, which can only be supplied by an American airlift or occasional boat; as a result prices are reported to have risen more than 300%, with foodstuffs up 400% in the past year. Speculation and corruption are also reported to have risen tremendously (Chicago Daily News, 6/12). In a separate report, the Chicago Tribune reported that millions of dollars of U.S. arms aid has been disappearing into Cambodia, much of it turning up with the Khmer Rouge (June 26).

The basic military and economic weakness is reflected above all in Lon Nol's political problems. His only real base of popular support when he took power was the teachers and students. By now, however, he was long since broken with both. In January 22,000 teachers went on strike, later supported by students. Students continued demonstrating regularly, culminating in a May 31st march of some 1,500 through the center of town; the killing of the Cambodian Minister of Education, after being held by demonstrating students, (the identity of the assassin is not yet known) symbolizes the major and perhaps irrevocable break between the Lon Nol government and students and teachers.

Lon Nol, however, has become increasingly isolated, even within the small coterie of politicians with which he surrounds himself. Forced through American pressure to join a coalition with Cheng Heng, Sirik Matak and In Tam about a year ago, Lon Nol has progressively gotten rid of each. This split was finally consummated recently when Long Boret formed a new cabinet in the aftermath of the Minister of Education's death. Six top cabinet officials quit; Sirik Matak was excluded from the new cabinet, along with all members of his Republican party. The final cabinet consisted of 7 members of Boret's Socio-Republican party, which supports Lon Nol; 6 independents; and two army men. Since In Tam had long since left, this newest cabinet reshuffle left Lon Nol with his narrowest political base since the U.S. forced him to take in the others a year earlier.

Under the circumstances then, it is hard to think of a single coherent reason why the Congress should give any aid to Lon Nol at all, let alone the astronomical sum of \$550

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million being asked for by the Administration for Fiscal Year 1975.

The major justification for our involvement in Cambodia originally was that it was necessary to protect U.S. ground troops fighting in South Vietnam.

As American troops were progressively withdrawn from South Vietnam, the Administration changed its rationale to protecting the Cambodians from a North Vietnamese invasion. During the past few years, however, the North Vietnamese have not been involved in the fighting between Lon Nol and Khmer Rouge troops. As the N.Y. Times reported on November 25, 1973:

"The Government tells them that they are fighting Vietnamese invaders and the soldiers are beginning to discover that that is not true. . . . Nobody sees North Vietnamese troops in battle any more. The voices that call to Government soldiers from across the battlefields are Khmer voices, the soldiers say; the bodies are Khmer bodies."

The new Administration position that lavish American aid to Lon Nol will show the other sides that it cannot win a military victory, thus pushing it towards negotiations. There is no evidence to support this point of view, however, and even less justification for why the United States should be involved in what is now admitted to be a civil war among Cambodians.

In fact, as in Laos, continued U.S. support to Lon Nol will simply lead to more fighting, less likelihood for a political settlement, and increased costs for the United States. Thus, it is that Lon Nol has lost territory and people in the past year, despite a giant U.S. military and air package totaling \$631.5 million, more than we gave to all of Latin America last year.

And thus it is that this staggering amount of money not only accomplished very little last year, but has seen the Administration ask for almost twice as much for FY 1975 in Cambodia (\$550.8 million) as it did in FY 74 (\$287.3 million).

Cambodia where the U.S. Executive today spends vast sums to keep a half-mad dictator in power despite his lack of any other observable support, either externally or internally, is the greatest example of our time of what is wrong about Presidential covert warfare.

As I have suggested, the time has come for Congress to move to terminate such war around the globe. I can think of no more appropriate place to begin than Cambodia.

(c) Laos—
 The one example of how Congress can terminate Presidential covert war in Indochina arises from Laos.

Since 1962 Laos has been the very model of the futility of Presidential covert war. Successive American administrations poured in billions of dollars, built up a Meo and then Thai "Secret Army," and dropped nearly 2 million tons of bombs on Laos, in an attempt to keep a small group of right-wing generals under the titular leadership of Souvanna Phouma in power.

The result? A steady increase in territory and population by the Pathet Lao; the decimation of the Meo people and heavy losses by Thai troops; the destruction of much of what was one of the most beautiful societies on the face of the earth; and the waste of perhaps more than \$10 billion and hundreds of American lives.

Throughout all those long years of Presidential covert war in Laos, moreover, the main obstacle to a political solution was clearly not the Laotians but rather a U.S. Executive which wished to bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos to aid its war effort in South Vietnam, use northern Laos as a base for intelligence-gathering missions into China and North Vietnam and, it was suggested in a Washington Star-News article dated May 21, 1974, "to suck the North Vietnamese" into Laos so as to tie up some

of their troops which, it was felt might otherwise be used in South Vietnam.

In 1978 however, due to increasing military gains by the Pathet Lao and the switch to covert U.S. involvement in South Vietnam, it was the U.S. which changed and decided to push the Lao right wing to accept a political settlement in Laos.

The result of this, of course, has been increased stability, a potential savings of hundreds of millions of dollars, and a potential end to American involvement in a war that few Americans ever know about, let alone desire.

Of course, the U.S. decision to push for a political settlement has also meant that the Pathet Lao have made considerable gains politically, and are in a much better position to one day govern Laos. But this is a lesson the American people must learn. I do not sense that it has been overly painful for them.

How long this situation will last, however, is anyone's guess. The U.S. Executive branch ultimately intervened both in 1958 and 1962 to prevent the Pathet Lao from taking power, and the danger exists that it will do so this time as well.

The clearest warning sign yet of this is the GAO report that the Administration has continued funneling aid to the Laotian right wing, in violation of the Laotian Peace Agreement.

It is clearly up to Congress to make the lesson of Laos stick by stipulating that no aid go to any projects in Laos unless approved unanimously by all factions in the Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU).

VIII. COVERT WAR: THE NECESSITY OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND TECHNOLOGY

It must be remembered that an Administration like that of the GVN or Lon Nol is not even remotely capable of maintaining their present military force levels.

In part, this is a simple matter of economics. The GVN is not capable of raising more than 15% of its annual income, with 85% coming from the United States. As a result, American funds and materiel are necessary to provide all the wherewithal to keep the GVN's 1.1 million man army and 2,000-plane air force from collapsing. And, of course, the Lon Nol government is even more penniless, making it even more dependent on American aid.

American personnel, however, are as important as U.S. materiel. If American personnel were not available to repair aircraft, handle logistics, plan operations, American equipment would either lie unused or unrepaired, appear on the black market of major cities, or be sold to the highest bidder (usually the PRG of Khmer Rouge)—in even greater quantities than now is the case.

During my trip to South Vietnam last year, for example, I was constantly told by American technicians that Thieu's air force and army would collapse in a matter of weeks without American technicians.

(a) U.S. Military Personnel

Thailand today serves as both the personnel and logistics base of the covert U.S. military presence in Indochina. Virtually all rice, ammunition and bombs used in Cambodia move from Sattahip port in southern Thailand (LA Times, May 8, 1974). U.S. personnel are training in Lao and Cambodian pilots in Udorn and other U.S. air bases in Thailand (June 13, 1974). Brigadier General James Hildreth, the U.S. officer in charge of Udorn Air Force Base, has admitted to reporters that the U.S. is still flying reconnaissance missions from Thailand over South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (LA Times, January 11, 1974); and U.S. officials have admitted flying reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam as well from Thailand. (See NY Times, April 21, 1973).

Thailand has also served as a major base for Air America, Air America, the CIA-owned

airline, has greatly increased its role in Indochina since the Ceasefire. Providing a civilian "cover," it performs many of the functions carried out by the U.S. Air Force before the Ceasefire: deploying local troops, transporting U.S. military and CIA personnel, dropping arms and supplies to local garrisons. It is no surprise that Congressman Aspin reported on January 9, 1974, that Air America in 1973 had doubled its contracts over 1972, from \$17.7 million up to \$41.4 million. The recent announcement that Air America has been purchased by Thai-American, Inc., was described as a response to public pressure in Thailand against the CIA. It remains to be seen if the functions being carried out by Air America will also be terminated, or whether instead they will now simply be carried out by Thai-American and/or other such companies. (Washington Post, June 4, 1974)

On March 28, 1974, Senator Harold Hughes revealed that an average of over 5,000 "hostile fire payments" had been made monthly to U.S. military personnel for activities in Indochina: 6,263 in October, 1973, 5,669 in November, 4,700 in December and 4,015 in January 1974. The Defense Department at the time explained that such payments were for "American servicemen who are performing non-combat activities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and whose presence . . . makes them vulnerable . . . to hostile fire." This revelation made it clear that U.S. military personnel, as well as U.S. civilians, were engaged in combat-related activities, although the Defense Department did not make it clear what these payments were being given for.

On June 5 Defense Secretary Schlesinger revealed what at least some of these payments were for. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Schlesinger stated that the U.S. Air Force was flying some 690 missions monthly out of Thailand into Cambodia, dropping supplies and ammunition to Lon Nol troops stationed in outlying outposts. The Defense Department later stated that the 690 figure was high for the month of August, 1973, and that the average was on the order of 425 missions a month throughout 1973. (UPI, June 6, 1974.)

U.S. fighter pilots flying protection for these supply missions into Cambodia are also drawing hostile fire pay, sources have reported to the Indochina Resource Center. Other activities for which U.S. military personnel could be drawing combat pay vary from similar supply and reconnaissance missions into Vietnam and Laos, to clandestine services as military advisors to local armed forces.

Within Indochina itself, U.S. personnel play an indispensable role in holding the local air forces and armies together. The logistics and technical requirements of keeping together South Vietnam's giant 1.1 million-man army and 2,000-plane air force, for example, make American technicians and logistics experts indispensable. As I stated previously, I was told repeatedly on my post-ceasefire visit to South Vietnam that neither Lon Non's nor Thieu's armed forces could function without these men.

American personnel are necessary to repair the sophisticated aircraft, tanks and other machines of war which are the mainstay of the Thieu and Lon Nol armies; to manage the gigantic logistics flow of billions of dollars worth of arms, ammunition, clothing, food and the thousands of other items necessary to keep the Lon Nol and Thieu military forces in the field; to carry out the overall direction and planning necessary to coordinate ground and air operations, plan out overall strategic operations, and carry out other tasks beyond the capacities of the Thieu or Lon Nol governments.

For example, American technicians have historically done the detailed and complicated work necessary to analyze recon photos to select bombing targets for the Thieu and

Lon Nol air forces. While it has not yet been revealed that this has continued since the Ceasefire, there is every reason to believe that the reconnaissance missions currently being carried out by American aircraft today over Indochina, in violation of the Paris Agreement, are being used for such targeting.

There are increasing indications, moreover, that American personnel are serving in advisory capacities in combat situations, in violation of Congressional law, as well as the Paris Agreement.

There are numerous reports, most notably by the General Accounting Office, that U.S. military and civilian personnel under the control of the CIA have been violating a Congressional ban against advising Cambodian troops on the ground. The most recent such reports were filed by the Washington Post on March 13, 1974, reporting the activities of a Major Ondecker who was directing Cambodian troops at Kampot; and by writer Richard Boyle, who recently returned from Cambodia with photographs and names of persons he claimed were advising Cambodian troops in combat.

There have also been periodic reports within South Vietnam of Americans involved in combat-related roles with the South Vietnamese armed forces.

The Boston Globe, for example, reported on January 27, 1974, that IBM executive Robert Ransom stated that on a recent trip to South Vietnam that he was told by a former American military advisor that "Americans are still flying gunships from Da Nang airbase . . . often camouflaged under a Red Cross emblem." David Shipley of the NY Times reported on 2/25/74 that: "American civilians . . . not only see that the South Vietnamese get the equipment they ask for, but also advise them on what to ask for . . . More direct, overt advice is sometimes given by zealous Americans who are still stationed in every province . . ."

There are also indications of an ongoing CIA role in Indochina separate from that of disguised U.S. military personnel since the Ceasefire. On July 24, 1973, for example, Tammy Arbuckle of the Washington Star-News reported that the CIA has been setting up Cambodian paramilitary units in several provinces in Cambodia, separate and distinct from the regular Cambodian army.

And in South Vietnam, U.S. Ambassador Martin was reported in a May 3, 1974, AP dispatch to have admitted that an Air America plane had been used to transport North Vietnamese POWs. Martin only made this admission after an AP photograph had been taken of seven North Vietnamese POWs being led onto the plane. Martin claimed that he had authorized the flight for "humanitarian" reasons to help one wounded prisoner, and did not know about the other six. It is well-known within South Vietnam that the CIA has been directly involved in the interrogation and torture of prisoners since the beginning of the war.

Similarly in Laos, although all Americans involved in the war have been reportedly withdrawn, 500 "civilians" remain behind, and the recent GAO revelation that the Administration has been directly funneling money to the Laotian right wing in violation of the Laotian Peace Agreement suggests that the Administration has no more intention of withdrawing its covert personnel from Laos today than it did in 1962. One's fears are not quieted by reports such as the March 14, 1974, letter in Rolling Stone from a U.S. airman stating that "(I am) stationed in a remote U.S. Air Force base in Thailand . . . Recently U.S. military forces are being introduced into this area, covertly, and especially into Vientiane and other Laotian areas."

The most complete report yet to emerge since the Ceasefire about American military activities in Indochina since the Ceasefire is that given by Steven M. Davis, who worked

for the Federal Electric Corporation in South Vietnam from January through June, 1973. Mr. Davis worked in the top-secret Saigon Telecommunications Center of the American Embassy. Colonel A. C. Berger of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in a letter dated November 7, 1973, to Senator George McGovern confirmed that Steven Davis did indeed work at the Telecommunications Facility during January-June, 1973, and also confirmed one of Mr. Davis's charges: that improper security procedures were being used.

Mr. Davis, as reported by Pacific News Service reporter Joan Holden, has reported the following based on his work at the Telecommunications Facility:

More than 100 U.S. military advisors are operating in Cambodia in violation of the Congressional ban on such activity.

More than 100 more Americans were serving as mercenaries with the Cambodian armed forces, under the control of the CIA. U.S. teams designated as search groups for U.S. Missing in Action have included personnel whose task is military spying.

General Kosh, an American captured by the Chinese during the Paracel Islands fighting, was actually an Army Captain advising Thieu army units under the guise of a civilian employee in charge of monitoring logistics flow to Da Nang.

The U.S. was not only flying regular reconnaissance missions in violation of the Paris Agreement, but U.S. aircraft were bombing in South Vietnam on occasion.

U.S. Air Force personnel were manning beacons within South Vietnam to guide aerial bombardment of Cambodia and South Vietnam.

(b) U.S. War Materiel.

The obvious importance of U.S. materiel and technology in keeping the Thieu and Lon Nol governments alive need not be stressed here.

It is useful to note, however, that the covert practice of attempting to use improved technology to compensate for low morale is so engrained that the Administration has been attempting to modernize equipment, blatantly violating Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, which holds that equipment can only be replaced on a "one-for-one" basis.

Congressman Aspin recently revealed, in the Congressional Record of June 13, 1974, that the Administration has requested funds violating the "one-for-one" clause of the Paris Agreement in four separate categories, namely:

Funds to modernize the South Vietnamese Air Force by replacing the F-5A with the technically superior F-5F.

Funds to send in C-130s to replace the far smaller C-7 transport aircraft presently in use.

Funds for 29 A-37B fighters to replace, in part, the old propeller-driven, single-engine A-1s.

Funds to modernize 4 transport aircraft by turning them into gunships.

And these examples, of course, are merely in addition to many other reported violations of the "one-for-one" clause, most notably the Administration plan to send in 60 F-5Es to replace the older F-5As. The F-5E is an entirely different plane than the F-5A, having twice the combat radius, nearly twice the acceleration rate, and carrying nearly a half-ton greater bomb load capacity. On April 7, 1974, moreover, the Saigon newspaper Dien Thi reported that 80 American specialists would arrive at Bien Hoa airbase to assemble the new F-5Es, within South Vietnam.

The most useful measure of the central role played by American materiel in supporting U.S. Presidential covert war in Indochina, however, is simply the sheer quantity of arms and ammunition being shipped into Indochina. As we have pointed out this quantity is far in excess of what even the Defense In-

telligence Agency claims is being shipped into Indochina by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. (See Table 6.)

Even more to the point, however, is that the Administration is clearly attempting to give Thieu far more materiel than he needs to defend himself.

In Fiscal Year 1974 the Administration allocated \$359 million in funding for the "procurement" section of its military aid to Thieu. In Fiscal Year 1975, however, the Administration is requesting more than twice as much, or \$652 million.

It should be noted that Administration officials unanimously state that they do not expect a major offensive in the coming year.

These vast inputs of covert American personnel and materiel, however, simply do not suffice to strengthen Thieu or Lon Nol. On the contrary—by keeping them dependent on American personnel and resources, there is no chance for the kind of structural changes necessary to fight their opponents. The result is simply increasing corruption, siphon and lack of morale—and increasing gains by their opposition, thus leading to increasing pressures for direct American intervention.

The Indochina Resource Center has received a number of reports, one of which is included here as Appendix Two, indicating that U.S. Marines are standing by to invade Cambodia should Phnom Penh be threatened.

As Executive officials grow more worried, moreover, they state quite openly their intention to resume American bombing should Saigon or Phnom Penh be seriously threatened.

On November 1, 1973, for example, U.S. Air Force Commander Vogt was quoted in the LA Times as saying, "Now that we're not actually dropping bombs, we must maintain our capability to resume such action if we have to . . . The whole idea of retaining these units in Thailand . . . is to be ready in case the enemy miscalculates and decides he wants to resume on a massive scale."

On December 3rd Defense Secretary Schlesinger was reported as saying that "If Hanoi . . . were to launch an all-out assault . . . I believe the President would be prepared to come back to Congress and ask for support of (U.S.) military activities in support of South Vietnam." And on January 7, 1974, Schlesinger repeated the threat, adding that he thought that Congress would agree.

The Administration is not simply threatening to resume the bombing by words, however. This year it has requested the giant sum of \$463 million—more than it is spending on all of Africa—to maintain American air units in Thailand prepared to resume the bombing.

IX. COVERT WAR; POLICE AND REFUGEE PROGRAMS FOR POPULATION CONTROL

The hallmark of Presidential covert war is its emphasis on controlling the local population. During the 1950s and 1960s, this emphasis saw the creation of nearly 14 million refugees, according to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, as much of rural Indochina was moved away from areas near rural guerrillas towards provincial capitals and cities where they could be more easily controlled. Also, during the 1960s the local police forces in Indochina were vastly expanded through American aid and advisors in an attempt to physically prevent the people from aiding the guerrilla forces once they were in areas of government control.

Once again, American personnel and funding have the key elements in both police and refugee programs for the last decade, due to the lack of technical expertise and economic base of the local administrations. There are numerous indications that this American role is continuing up to the present day.

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(a) Police Programs.

The GVN's reliance on police programs to control the population since the Ceasefire has been well-documented. On June 7, 1974, for example, Rep. Bella Abzug inserted in the Congressional Record a listing of more than 100 articles appearing in the western press since the Ceasefire, most emanating directly from Saigon, which detail the continuing operations of the GVN's police and prison system.

A wide variety of western sources have documented that Saigon's 120,000-man police force has continued constant sweeps, post-curfew round-ups of men, women and children, constant checks on ID cards and frequent arrests and torture of individuals on political charges since the Ceasefire.

In testimony before the House Pacific Affairs Subcommittee on September 13, 1973, for example, I described the police system in South Vietnam as I saw it upon my visit there in June and July, 1973:

Constant surveillance of the population as a whole;

Random arrests carried out during systematic sweeps throughout GVN towns and villages;

Detention and torture of numerous individuals without benefit of counsel;

Summary sentencing either by a military court or, in most cases, by "administrative detention" in which the arrestee has no counsel or trial;

Imprisonment for years characterized by lack of proper food, water, and medical care; and

Increased surveillance and harassment upon release from prison.

Extensive documentation has emerged also of the continued detention of tens of thousands of political prisoners since the Ceasefire, as well as a continuing policy of new arrests since the Ceasefire.

On September 13, 1973, for example, Representative Abzug entered into the record of the House Pacific Affairs Subcommittee hearing an official telegram from the national Phoenix Directorate ordering all local Phoenix offices to continue operations. This telegram, printed in *Le Monde* on May 17, 1973, clearly indicated that the GVN was continuing to "neutralize," i.e., arrest or assassinate, individuals.

The Administration openly intended to keep funding the GVN's police and prison system after the Ceasefire. On June 4, 1973, for example, Senator Kennedy revealed that the U.S. Agency for International Development was requesting \$15.2 million for continued funding of the GVN's police and prison system for the Fiscal Year beginning July 1, 1973, i.e., six months after the Paris Agreement had been signed. (See the Congressional Record, June 4, 1973, S10204.)

Subsequent Congressional action forced the Administration to stop such direct funding of the police and prison system. Despite this, however, the fact that U.S. funds supply at least 55% of the GVN's income means, of course, that the lion's share of maintaining the GVN's police system still comes from the U.S., however indirectly.

The complexities of the GVN's police apparatus, moreover, necessitate American advice and support. During the past decade, for example, the U.S. Office of Public Safety planned and implemented a National ID Card Program which saw the issuance of over 10 million ID cards to all Vietnamese over the age of 15. All Vietnamese are required to carry these ID cards, on pain of arrest. The cards are linked to giant computers, in which fingerprints and bio-dossiers are stored, located at the Telecommunications Directorate.

Under the Paris Agreement, the Administration was required to withdraw all advisors to Saigon's police force. In February, 1974, however, one year after the signing of the Paris Agreement, a team of Americans sent

to Saigon by the right-wing American Security Council reported that:

"A handful of U.S. civilian technicians continue to provide advice in the operation of a newly-installed computer system which keeps tabs on more than 10 million South Vietnamese." (From Vietnam Report: "Not in Vain", American Security Council, page 8)

The NY Times, in its February 25, 1974, survey of continuing American involvement in South Vietnam after the Ceasefire, reported that:

"The South Vietnamese National Police continue to receive regular advice from Americans . . . to high-ranking (Vietnamese police) officers said they and their staffs met frequently with the Saigon station chief of the CIA and his staff. . . . Police officials confirmed that in some provinces American liaison men who work with the police remain on the job. . . . Local policemen still refer to 'American police advisers'. . . . Police here have military functions and engage in infiltration, arrest, interrogation and torture of Communists and political dissidents."

Steven Davis, the Federal Electric Corporation employee who worked at the Saigon Telecommunications Directorate, has reported that on May 14, 1973, he saw a message to local CIA officers in South Vietnam directing that the Phoenix program in South Vietnam was to be transferred to the South Vietnamese National Police, thus freeing local agents under the control of the CIA to start new Phoenix programs in South Vietnam in areas where Phoenix had not yet operated.

(b) Refugee Programs.

Since the Ceasefire, the GVN has openly continued its policy of concentrating refugees in camps and refusing to allow them to return to their original villages.

On January 25, 1973, for example, two days before the Paris Agreement was signed, the Washington Post reported that:

"The South Vietnamese government will not permit hundreds of thousands of refugees from Communist-held areas to return to their homes after the cease-fire takes effect and will punish them if they try, according to U.S. officials here."

In addition to keeping refugees in their camps, moreover, GVN policy has also aimed at enlarging its claimed territorial control by forcibly removing refugees to areas uninhabited by either side. On March 22, 1973, and July 5, 1973, for example, the NY Times reported "resettlement" of several hundred thousand people in an effort "to get broader control."

The result has been unending misery for millions of refugees who have been forced to live on arid, unproductive soil, in areas where farming is almost impossible. On November 23, 1973, for example, the Washington Post reported:

"As if on cue, the inhabitants of Thanh-thuy's moldering shanties come out to plead with their unexpected visitors: we are hungry. This land is poor. We want to go back to our village. Please ask the government to let us go home."

Police controls in such refugee camps are tight.

On March 28, 1974, for example, Diane Jones of the American Friends Service Committee testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee on conditions in refugee camps she had visited in South Vietnam between October, 1973, and February, 1974. She reported that:

"These camps looked nothing like villages, but like concentration camps, some of them totally surrounded by barbed wire or bamboo stake fences, with tall military watchtowers on the perimeters . . . people were not allowed beyond the camp boundaries except during certain hours of the day. . . . The inhabitants of these camps had to register with camp officials when they left and

when they returned. In Xuyen Phuoc camp in Quang Nam province, I talked extensively with a government official who told me his job was political control of the population . . . he showed me stacks of pictures, one picture of each family in the camp . . . he said that he had to check daily each family against their family report. . . . If anyone disappeared without asking permission, he said the person's family could be arrested."

American policy is directly responsible for such refugee control programs.

In Fiscal Year 1974 the Administration expended over \$70 million on such refugee programs. In Fiscal Year 1975, it is requesting \$116.5 million to continue them, an increase of more than 50%.

There are convincing indications, moreover, that American officials are aware of the true nature of this refugee program. Indeed, the evidence indicates that this policy of controlling refugees may be as much a result of deliberate American policy as GVN's desires.

A U.S. Senate Refugee Subcommittee study published one year after the signing of the Paris Agreement, for example, reprints several internal U.S. documents. One, an official description of refugee resettlement sites in Military Region II, dated October 17, 1973, characterizes 30 resettlement sites as being economically unviable.

A letter from the U.S. Consul General in Bien Hoa, Mr. Robert Walkinshaw, dated April 3, 1973, states that:

"The people will move into areas that were previously considered marginal, thus secure the area, improve movement and security along major routes of communication, develop the agriculture . . . and bring economic viability to the country as a whole."

And the most thorough and convincing picture yet to emerge of the U.S. role in refugee control was presented to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 2, 1974, by Mr. Edward Block, an A.I.D. refugee official in South Vietnam from April, 1972, until December, 1973.

"The real objectives of the U.S. mission (include) to encourage the GVN to hold hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of refugees as dependents of the government rather than allowing them to return freely and peacefully to their original villages . . . to help the Saigon government to occupy additional territory presently contested or claimed by the PRG. . . ."

"(This) objective is evidenced by the fact that the GVN continued to keep more than a half million refugees in camps long after the Ceasefire agreement had been signed. . . ."

"Hundreds of thousands of refugees from the 1972 April offensive are currently being poorly resettled under the same conditions that exist for the 1968-1971 refugees. . . ."

"Little or no assistance is provided for land clearing; refugees are often placed in resettlement where no land is available; little or no farmland is ever distributed where it is available . . . in many cases, food allowances are arbitrarily cut off, causing widespread hunger and malnutrition."

"The Steng Montagnards of Binh Long province (were) concentrated for a year and a half in the squalid An Loi refugee camp where they watched more than 300 of their children die like flies."

"A.I.D. officials argue that no refugees have come forth to request their return to home in PRG-controlled areas. This argument might as well be no refugees have come forth to commit suicide, because the GVN still maintains a policy of shooting or jailing anyone caught moving about in areas outside of its immediate control."

"Once the GVN occupies . . . new areas, it wastes little time in seizing this opportunity to utilize refugees for their own counterinsurgency purposes, despite possible hazards to the people involved. For example, I know first-hand that in resettlement in

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Quang Nam province, the GVN has been busy recruiting children between the ages of 7 and 14 to perform intelligence and detection work within their villages and the surrounding areas."

X. PRESIDENTIAL COVERT WAR: A TIME TO SPEAK FOR THE LIVING

There is no more ominous sign for the future health of this nation than our present tendency to speak of our Indochina involvement as if it has ended.

We rarely speak of it at all. The media rarely carries the many stories filed from Indochina.—Walter Cronkite is reported as saying that we know we lost the war, and therefore want to forget it. Time and again, traveling about the country, one is told that "people just don't want to hear about Vietnam any more."

To the extent that Vietnam is still an issue. It is as if it were a long-distant tragedy, one that laid its heaviest burdens on Americans. "Vietnam" today means primarily veterans' problems, amnesty, POWs, the accounting for U.S. Missing-in-Action.

These concerns are understandably real to most Americans. Our Vietnam past haunts us, and will for many years to come.

The time, however, has clearly come to speak of the present as well, to remember not only the dead but the living.

It is time to speak of tens of thousands of political prisoners in South Vietnam, subjected to torture, hunger, thirst and beatings at this very moment, people who have been imprisoned without trial or hope or relief.

It is time to speak of millions of refugees in Cambodia and South Vietnam whom we helped bomb and force out of their ancestral homes, people who sit landless and jobless in arid camps today because we still help prevent their return to the villages of their birth.

It is time to speak of the millions more in South Vietnam now being watched, subjected to mass round-ups, harassed by a nightmarish police system that we created.

And,—most of all—It is time today to speak of the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and Cambodian and Laotians who are alive and whole, but will be dead or maimed a year from today if Administration aid requests are granted.

It is time to speak of these living,—not only for their sakes, but for ours.

I will never forget the words of a Laotian refugee whom I interviewed after he had survived 5 years of our bombing in north-eastern Laos:

"In the region of the Plain of Jars, there came to be a lake of blood and destruction. For there were airplanes and the sound of bombs throughout the skies and the hills. All we had were the holes."

This nation as a whole learned during the 1960s that we could not ignore this lake of blood. We learned that, for example:

To let our Executive leaders destroy abroad meant that they would not construct a Great or New Society at home;

To tolerate Presidential lawlessness in Indochina would lead to Presidential lawlessness in Watergate; and

To ignore the CIA's police mentality in Vietnam would see this mentality blossom here through data banks, electronic surveillance, and countless other invasions of privacy.

Much progress has been made, finally. At long last, the principle is finally taking hold that we have no right to intervene in other nations' internal affairs. We can now dream of the day when our leaders will turn away from interference abroad to meeting the needs of their own people at home.

But for this progress to continue, today's ongoing Presidential covert war in Indochina can no longer be ignored.

There is almost unanimous agreement today that we were "wrong" to get involved in Indochina. Some say this from a legal

point of view, others from a moral one, and still others from a practical perspective. But virtually all Americans say it today.

What we must also say, however, is that if this Presidential covert involvement was "wrong" in 1954, it is also "wrong" in 1974.

For if we are to learn one single lesson from the past 25 years of U.S. intervention in Indochina, let it be this:

We must confront the lake of blood our leaders are still creating in Indochina,—no matter how unpleasant, difficult or painful. For it has already begun to wash across this land, leaving spiritual and physical gashes that will be felt for generations.

And, in the end, this lake of blood will either engulf us,—or purify us and set us free.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY ROA NATIONAL CONVENTION ON JULY 6, 1974

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, 30 resolutions were adopted by the Reserve Officers Association at their national convention at Atlanta, Ga., July 6, 1974. These resolutions represent the best thinking of the leaders in this outstanding organization dedicated to preserving a strong national defense posture.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent these resolutions be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolutions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, JULY 6, 1974

RESOLUTION NO. 1: U.S. RIGHTS IN THE PANAMA CANAL

Whereas, a recent agreement has been signed by the United States Secretary of State and the Panamanian Foreign Minister to draft a new treaty, terminating the Panama Treaty of 1903, and

Whereas, the new treaty will eventually transfer and surrender title, control, operation and defense of the Canal and Canal Zone to Panama together with other concessions, and

Whereas, the Reserve Officers Association of the United States has previously resolved that it supports the retention of the United States' rights to utilization, control and protection of the Panama Canal, and

Whereas, the Constitution of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States (Article A-2) states that "the object of the Association shall be to support a military policy for the United States that will provide adequate National Security and to promote the development and execution thereof," and

Whereas, House Resolution 93, 93rd Congress, gives the United States full sovereign rights, power and authority in perpetuity over the Canal Zone,

Now therefore be it resolved that in the best interests of the national security of the United States, the Reserve Officers Association of the United States affirms its previous action and supports a national policy which gives the United States full sovereign rights, authority, control, operation and defense of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone in perpetuity, and

Be it further resolved that no Executive action be taken respecting the foregoing without the approval of the Congress of the United States.

RESOLUTION NO. 2: ARMY AND AIR FORCE RESERVE TECHNICIAN CAREER PROGRAM

Whereas, the current Army and Air Force Reserve Technician Programs have been in effect for some years without specific statutory basis, based only on administrative

agreements between the Army, Air Force and the Civil Service Commission, and

Whereas, the legal restrictions on these agreements have led to a situation in which career management of Army and Air Force Technicians is becoming increasingly difficult, and

Whereas, it is necessary to reconcile the personnel management and career patterns of technicians as Reserves and Civil Service employees, and

Whereas, it is also necessary and desirable that the military career patterns of technicians and other Reserves be one and the same, and

Whereas, the Air Force, serving as the Department of Defense executive agent, has prepared a legislative proposal (DOD Program No. 93-21) to provide a statutory basis for the technician program which will require technicians to be fully qualified under military standards for the Reserve position to which assigned and giving due consideration to the protection of those individuals concerned and to a balanced career program.

Now therefore be it resolved that the Reserve Officers Association of the United States supports the legislative proposals concerning the Army and Air Force Technician Career Program.

RESOLUTION NO. 3: RESERVE RETIRED BENEFITS, TOTAL DISABILITY

Whereas, Chapter 67, Title 10, U.S. Code (formerly Title III, Public Law 80-810) provides for retired pay to members of the Reserve components after completing 20 or more years of satisfactory federal service and upon attaining statutory age (currently age 60) but provides neither retired pay nor other benefits prior to attaining such age, and

Whereas, members of the Reserve components transferred to the Retired Reserve pending attainment of statutory age are, in effect, "in limbo" as to receipt of retired benefits, though otherwise qualified for and entitled for such benefits at statutory age 60, and

Whereas, Chapter 67, Title 10, U.S. Code has no provisions for those members of the Reserve components transferred to the Retired Reserve awaiting attainment of statutory age who have subsequently become totally disabled, and

Whereas, current members of the Reserve components transferred to the Retired Reserve after completing 20 or more years of satisfactory federal service have reached the normal peak of their earning capacity and likewise their financial needs, but will normally be in dire financial straits because of total disability and inability to work, and

Whereas, it is both just and right to provide more liberal benefits to the totally disabled, and

Whereas, the totally disabled are more likely to forfeit their earned benefits through death, and

Whereas, it is deemed that the foregoing would be strong incentive for attaining and retaining Reserve component personnel strength in an all-volunteer force or a zero-draft environment,

Now therefore be it resolved that the Reserve Officers Association of the United States seek and support appropriate legislation which would provide for all retired benefits for current members of the Reserve components who suffer total disability not resulting from intentional misconduct or willful neglect and are otherwise qualified for retired pay except for not having reached the statutory age.

RESOLUTION NO. 4: LEGAL DEFENSE FOR RESERVISTS

Whereas, the Attorney General of Ohio refused to provide legal defense for the Ohio National Guardsmen on active duty during the Kent State University riots until directed to do so by the governor, and